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I APPRECIATE this opportunity to express my recent views on the study
of kinship, la parenté. I am pleased because it gives me the chance of
rectifying some of my own past errors. I want to bring my thoughts
on this subject more systematically in line with my more recent writings
in The Theft of History (2008) and Renaissances. The One or the Many ?
(2010).
The basic problem for anthropologists, as for sociologists, historians
and other scholars, is to have accepted, without adequate analysis,
the division which has marked not only anthropology but also sociology,
the division between « traditional » and « modern » societies, where
modern of course equals western. This binary division has posed
a problem for anthropology in many ways, drawing a rather heavy-line
between modern (so-called capitalist) and earlier (primitive) society.
In English, as far as the domestic culture was concerned, the latter became
the domain of kinship, the other of the family. I am not sure what
the equivalent was in French but possibly la parenté and la famille.
The spheres which should have been interlocking were driven apart.
The distinction is politically based. This is to say, it originates in the
divide that westerners have placed between we and they, the gulf between
barbarian (or traditional or the elementary forms) and modernity.
« Modernity » is seen as growing with the Renaissance and the Industrial
Revolution but this development only crystallized our view of the other
and of their essential primitiveness, not only in Africa and the Pacific but
also more surprisingly in China and India. Many important scholars
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reconstruct an earlier Chinese kinship in terms of cross-cousin marriage,
as did Émile Durkheim and Marcel Mauss for « Primitive Classification »
and this categorisation was used by Claude Lévi-Strauss to compare
Australian systems. At the same time Louis Dumont made comparisons
between South Indian (Dravidian) kinship and again that of Australia
(Kariera). The Great Divide came between those systems and western
Europe who were considered to have developed the small conjugal, mono-
gamous, family. Some like the sociologist Talcott Parsons saw this family
as being « compatible » with capitalism in that it encouraged a mobile
workforce that was acummulating for its own welfare. Others like Peter
Laslett and the Cambridge Group of historical demography saw the
« small family » and the European Marriage Pattern as going back to the
period before the Renaissance and as Europe being already adapted for
economic advance. In another context that was the argument of many
others, of the historian David Landes and the anthropologist Alan 
Macfarlane for example who saw Europe as being ready for capitalism, as
a result of either its Judaeo-Christian or its Germanic-Roman heritage.
But not the Rest. In my view it was the wrong line in the wrong place.
One of the major problems both for social anthropology and for social
demography, is that the two traditions have continued in more or less
complete intellectual isolation, and attempts to synthesize kinship or la
parenté with the sociological or demographic family seem to have made
little contribution to any such meeting of minds, except perhaps in the
topics of incest and exogamy (for which see Godelier 2004 and Barry
2008). However in this endeavour the greatest failure is the limitation of
the variables one is considering and the exclusion of an examination of
the economy. How can one exclude this in comparing recent Asia and
aboriginal Australia ?
This omission I tried to rectify in a wide-ranging comparison based
not only on intensive studies but on the use of Murdock’s contested
Ethnographic Atlas which employed the method used by Edward B. Tylor,
author of Primitive Culture (1871), to examine the distribution of
exogamy and endogamy. Following the observation of a Dutch merchant
in West Africa, I pursued the problem of bridewealth there (connected
with the former and with economically relatively egalitarian societies) and
the dowry in Eurasia (connected with the latter and with distinct
economic class). I tried to tie this question of marriage transactions
in with the transfer of property between generations and sexes at death on
which I have commented, and that with the economy.
By giving weight to marriage transactions in this way, you might think
this represented a switch to the thinking of Lévi-Strauss, a preference for
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affinity (alliance) over filiation. That would be the wrong way to look at
the problem because both principles were much involved in domestic
organisation. Regarding filiation, there is a focus in Eurasia not so much
on the sibling group of men (well discussed in the African context) but on
the cross-sibling group of girls as well as boys. Since dowry is associated
with class societies, it is important to maintain (and sometimes to
promote) the status of women (who transmit class) as well as of men (who
do so too). So part of the family wealth (what I have called the conjugal
fund) is attached to daughters, so they can make the « right » marriage in
a stratified system and can maintain themselves after the union. This is
not to say that a daughter’s portion of the family wealth is necessarily
equal to the son’s (who retains the family estate as far as land is concerned)
but it is often substantial. Nor is it to affirm that the husband
never appropriates his wife’s dowry – he can usually make use of it. But
essentially she is receiving « her » portion of the family wealth ; the dowry
is therefore not simply the mirror of bridewealth, which is an affinal
resource essentially for men. Dowry however is attached to women.
This much is clear from European history – from the life of Eleanor
of Aquitaine, for example. The marriage transaction, dowry, was part of
the process of transmission within the family ; as such it was related
to inheritance, which included women. This aspect is especially apparent
in the Biblical story of the daughters of Zelophehad who, if they married
outside the tribe, could not inherit property i.e. take it outside. Dowry
and bisexual transmission were linked to endogamy, to marriage in.
Examples of enclosed marriage are that of the father’s brother’s daughter in
Arab countries, the close one permitted in early Israel and Persia, and the
extreme case of the brother-sister unions of Egypt, all of which were,
partially at least, attempts to contain marriage among kin and to ensure
that property, including qualities, did not pass outside the family, as is
the case with the daughters of Zelophehad.
In this form of marriage transaction, Europe and Asia were one ; there
was none of the Asiatic exceptionalism that nineteenth-century European
writers, living with the results of the Industrial Revolution, had posited.
Marriage was largely monogamous. Nor of course were there systematic
differences in the case of the descent systems, which with various modifi-
cations were found throughout the continent although they certainly
tended to disappear (as did all extended systems) with industrialization.
But as David Aberle (1961) has clearly shown for matrilineal systems, you
tended to find them with all sorts of economy. However the dowry was
found only with class societies that in this sense occurred with the Bronze
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There is a related problem. If you allow women to inherit, you are
already excluding more distant men. Princess Elizabeth inherited the
throne of England (plus estate) rather than a more distant male cousin.
This exclusion obviously threatens the solidarity of the masculine clan or
line and places the emphasis on the nuclear family, the offspring of a
conjugal pair. It produces a twist to the kinship system that you do not
find in Africa for example, namely the problem of the heiress. This is a
woman without brothers who inherits the family property, including the
landed estate, which she uses to attract a man to come and live with her
in what I call « filiacentric union », a union in which the power relations
are changed and the woman « wears the trousers » (which is what Princess
Elizabeth did with the throne).
Now these various forms of kinship are not confined to one part of the
Eurasian continent, to Europe or to Asia ; they are found in all the major
post-Bronze-Age societies of Eurasia, as one would expect. But in empha-
sising the comparability of these societies, we go completely against the
view, crystallized by Marx but present in the ideas of most nineteenth and
twentieth century Europeans, that the European and Asian families were
quite different in « kinship » terms, that the former was linked to the
advent of capitalism while the latter was marked by « backwardness »
which did not permit this development to take place.
A central voice in this discussion was that of the Reverend Malthus at
the beginning of the nineteenth century. For him Asia was fundamentally
different in demographic and kinship terms from Europe. The latter he
claimed showed restraint in having later marriage and therefore in post-
poning sex and childbirth, whereas Asia had early marriage which led to
increased childbirth and indeed meant abandoning the control of family
size. This was the common view of Europeans and Europeanists who
related the differences, as Malthus had done, to the advent of our
« modernity » (our « capitalism ») and to the backwardness of the east
(from this point of view longstanding). The large clan of China according
to Max Weber was seen as inhibiting economic advance. That is, from the
common heritage of the Near Eastern Bronze Age, which affected both
east and west in virtually similar ways, what Childe called the Urban
Revolution, producing the culture of cities, or civilisation in his usage,
there resulted a supposed bifurcation in which one area, the east, was
marked by the stasis of an « agricultural civilisation », whereas the other
was marked by dynamic growth, leading to capitalism ; in Marxist
versions, there was an Asiatic mode of production and a bureacratic state
(Asiatic exceptionalism) on the one hand, while Europe moved from a
phase of Antiquity (with slavery), to feudalism and then to capitalism.
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But the opposition was wrong, at least at the Malthussian and demo-
graphic level of reproduction. As James Lee and Wang Feng (1999) have
shown, although the Chinese married earlier, their fertility in marriage was
less than in the European case ; they expressed « restraint » of a so-called
Protestant kind within marriage rather than before, being supported by a
post-partum sex taboo. So they were not increasing at a greater rate. That
collapsed the Malthus argument and also that of most later demographic
historians, who had accepted the idea that the east procreated without
considering the consequences. That notion has been shown by these
authors to be quite mistaken.
That is not to say there was no difference between Europe and Asia.
Marriage took place earlier in the latter, but at this level there is nothing
to link one region with the advent of capitalism rather than the other. Nor
does the widespread refinement of the thesis which has been the core of so
much recent research centring upon the so-called European marriage
pattern. That comprised not only late marriage for men and women but
a substantial number never marrying, as well as the linked institution of
external service of the young and unmarried in other households. This
complex was said to run from Moscow to Trieste, known as the Hajnal
line, an area which included northwest Europe, in particular Holland and
Britain, but excluded much of Italy where the historical Renaissance, and
the rebirth of Europe, had began. Demographic and kinship factors did
not seem to be relevant for the « birth » of capitalism.
That is to say, one did not find the usual kinship variables leading up
to a « capitalist family ». Kinship, as understood by anthropologists, was in
fact insulated from the pattern of development, except in restricted
spheres. One of these was the shift from bridewealth to dowry, as the
result of the greater socio-economic differentiation of post-Bronze Age
society. The second is the move to slim down all kinship systems to
produce a « small family ». The second feature is complex. It is clear that
in the east, kinship systems have remained more extensive. That has not
inhibited but sometimes encouraged the growth of exchange, as can be
seen from Faure’s discussion of the clan business in China (Faure 2006)
and of Rudner’s analysis of money lending among the Chettiars in South
India (Rudner 1994). In any case there are no grounds for thinking that
development along capitalist lines has been inhibited. Weber was wrong.
One reason for the misunderstanding is that we need to pay more
attention than we have to « the domestic group ». The domestic group
that reproduces human life lies at the heart of all clanship and other
kinship institutions throughout the human world and many similar
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clanship or bilateral groups, have at the core a domestic group, a living
group (a group lives together or nearby), and the difference between
a small or a large family is a matter of stripping away the more extensive
ties, and this group, with some difference, is found in China and
in Europe. I have lived for some time in families in India and China
and in my view the similarities with the west are striking, nor does there
seem to be anything in their structure to prevent the development of
a capitalist system.
The binary division between modern and traditional obscures points
of contact, just as Malthus obscured the question of the similarity in
procreativity between Europe and Asia. This problem became particularly
problematic, because in the evolutionary schemes of Marx and others,
Europe with its later achievements was given a completely different trajec-
tory from the rest of the world, and specifically from Asia. Historically
this is wrong because both the east and the west of the Eurasian continent
benefitted from the shift to Bronze Age (metal) cultures, first recorded in
the Ancient Near East. It is there that we find the Urban Revolution,
which in the countryside produced the plough and with it a significant
measure of economic and social differentiation (class) which you don’t
get with the hoe, and which of course the dowry system maintains over
the generations. And more importantly for growth in various domains,
its invention of writing (pace Derrida who thinks writing universal).
This differentiated regime developed compatible kinship systems which
I have discussed at some length in a volume I edited, Bridewealth and
Dowry (with Stanley J. Tambiah) and in another (translated into French as
Famille et mariage en Eurasie by Presses universitaires de France) called
The Oriental, the Ancient and the Primitive. There I insisted upon the
similarities of Eurasian systems (despite differences in descent and in
sometimes plural marriage). This recognition led me in time to emphasise
the similarities not only in kinship but in the economy and in the general
level of development in the two areas. This was logical since, as I have
remarked, both wings of the Eurasian continent went through the same
Bronze Age revolution. Both developed differentiated, trading, societies,
based on « intensive » agriculture (with the plough), on the elaboration
of technologies (metallurgy etc.) and a written civilisation, with all that
it entailed in terms of more rapid and permanent accumulation of know-
ledge and cultural exchange.
The same starting point meant that the different areas present roughly
parallel scenes. There were certain periods where one clearly dominated.
As did China in the 18th century which was the workshop of the world
and its greatest exporter. Western markets had to bring in opium from
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India and even water (in the form of ice) from Boston ponds unless they
were to export bullion (and a few other products). With the Industrial
Revolution in the west and the development of mechanised production,
using iron machinery driven by non-human energy, the west took over
the lead. It was then that China was seen as close to « other cultures »,
to the primitive, as one of those that never made it to capitalism whereas
the supremacy of the west asserted itself in making its way to that
goal through Antiquity, Feudalism and the Renaissance. But this road
to capitalism was certainly not exclusive. In recent years we have seen first
Japan, then the Four Asian Tigers, more recently the sleeping giants
of China and India, as making their mark in the developing world and
setting aside that fundamental division between we and they, the east and
the west. Many anthropologists have spent a great deal of time in showing
why this could never happen, especially in terms of domestic life. But it
has happened and it should have made us rethink many theories,
of kinship and more generally.
University of Cambridge, Cambridge (England)
jrg1@cam.ac.uk
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15Jack Goody, Kinship and the “Great Divide”. —
The article questions the binary opposition
between « traditional » and « modern » socie-
ties, or of East and West, in which the latter
is « capitalist » and civilized, and the former
« primitive ». This has marked both anthro-
pology and sociology. The article focuses on
the question of demography and the family.
It queries attempts to establish a fundamen-
tal difference between the family structures
of Europe and Asia, with the former being
deemed more suitable for the development
of « capitalism ». Challenging Malthus’view
of China, among others, it highlights simila-
rities, rather than differences, in terms of the
dowry, inheritance, and the class system in
Eurasia. These are common features shared
by post-Bronze Age, urban, and stratified
societies.
Jack Goody, Parenté et “Grand partage”. —
Cet article revient sur l’opposition binaire
qui a marqué de son empreinte la pensée tant
anthropologique que sociologique, entre
Orient et Occident, c’est-à-dire entre sociétés
dites « traditionnelles » et sociétés dites
« modernes », où les premières sont consi-
dérées comme « primitives » et les secondes
comme « capitalistes » et donc « civilisées ».
En s’intéressant plus particulièrement aux
thématiques de la parenté et de la famille, il
s’agit de remettre en question les tentatives
visant à établir une différence fondamentale
entre les modèles familiaux d’Europe et
d’Asie, pour lesquelles le système européen
aurait été le plus apte à favoriser le dévelop-
pement du capitalisme. Récusant cet argument
que l’on doit, entre autres, aux présupposés
de Malthus à propos de la Chine, nous 
mettrons plutôt ici en évidence les simili-
tudes existant sur tout l’espace eurasiatique
en termes de parenté : notamment la dot,
l’héritage ou le système de classes, partagés
par toutes les grandes sociétés urbaines et
stratifiées d’Europe et d’Asie issues de l’âge
du bronze, apportant ainsi la preuve que,
dans ce creuset eurasiatique, s’est donc forgée
une relative unité civilisationnelle.
ABSTRACT/RÉSUMÉ
